Medical research has always been a risky enterprise. The management of risks produced by doctors\' actions is especially difficult when the goal of a medical intervention is not curative. Sick persons may be willing to take many chances to get well, but healthy people tend to reject risk, however slight. It is not surprising that the first well known public debate about the dangers of medical intervention dealt with the risk/benefit ratio of smallpox inoculation. In this debate, conducted at the Académie des Sciences in Paris in 1760, the opposing speakers were the Swiss mathematician Daniel Bernoulli and the French philosopher Jean D\'Alembert. Bernoulli compared the risk of dying from inoculation with the lifetime risk of death from smallpox, and concluded that inoculated persons gained on average three years of life expectancy. D\'Alembert affirmed that parents who face the danger that their decision will lead to an immediate death of their child do not reason in terms of the probability of remote events, and that only persons who face the consequences of a given action---and not experts or politicians---have the right to decide what kind of risk they are willing to take. At the same time, the smallpox vaccination debate interrogated the limits of state intervention in private decisions and the reliability of data used to define public health policies. All these questions, Halpern shows, prefigured later dilemmas.

At the centre of *Lesser harms* is an analysis of early attempts to develop a vaccine against polio. In spite of its relatively low impact in terms of overall mortality and morbidity, polio was seen as an especially threatening disease: it mainly killed or crippled children, was not related to poverty or poor sanitation, and nobody knew how it could be prevented. Halpern has uncovered rich archive material dealing with attempts to develop an anti-polio vaccine in the 1930s and early 1950s. In the mid-1930s, two US scientists, Maurice Brodie from the public health laboratory of the city of New York, and John Kolmer, who collaborated with a private company, the Institute for Cutaneous Medicine in Philadelphia, conducted clinical essays with candidate polio vaccine. Both Brodie\'s and Kolmer\'s vaccines were problematic. Brodie\'s vaccine, made with a killed virus did not induce a sufficient level of protective antibodies and it occasionally produced severe allergic reactions. Kolmer\'s vaccine, made with live virus, was probably insufficiently attenuated, and could therefore produce polio. Neither Brodie nor Kolmer made extensive tests on animals before turning to human experimentation, probably because of the high cost of testing the vaccine in monkeys. In the 1930s, human experimentation was not regulated by the law, and the accidents of anti-polio vaccination were not discussed in the media. Nevertheless, Halpern shows that thanks to the moral pressure of the scientific community, the discovery of the existence of such accidents led to a rapid interruption of the vaccination campaign. The memory of the 1930s\' failed attempts to develop anti-polio vaccine led to better public supervision of clinical trials of that vaccine in the 1950s. On the other hand, some of the 1950s\' trials of anti-polio vaccine were still hidden from the public\'s gaze. Moral pressure of colleagues, Halpern argues, is efficient only when exercised against individuals whose reputation and status may be seriously affected by criticism of their peers (say, academic scientists), not against those (say, industrial scientists) who can afford to ignore such criticism.

Halpern tells an interesting story well, and she provides a stimulating analysis of moral dilemmas related to the choice of "lesser harm". Such dilemmas are, however, only a part of the story of medical experimentation. One would like to learn more about the structure of relevant professional communities, the criteria of acceptance or rejection of evidence, hierarchy and stratification among virologists and epidemiologists, the role of statisticians or the economic issues at stake. Halpern does not provide all the answers, but she asks many important questions---not a small achievement.
